Authentication/authorization bypass via durable handle reconnect (MS-SMB2 SecurityContext mismatch)
Description
The ksmbd durable handle reconnect flow did not verify the reconnecting client's identity against the original opener. This allowed an authenticated user to hijack an orphaned durable handle by guessing or brute-forcing the persistent ID (DHnC). The patch adds a durable_owner to ksmbd_file to store the original opener's UID, GID, and account name, captures owner information when a file handle becomes orphaned, and introduces ksmbd_vfs_compare_durable_owner() to validate the reconnection identity during SMB2_CREATE (DHnC). This closes the gap where any authenticated user could reconnect to a durable handle opened by another user.
Proof of Concept
PoC outline (conceptual):
Prereqs:
- A Linux host with ksmbd patched as per the commit and an SMB2-capable client.
- Two users on the host: alice (UID 1001) and bob (UID 1002).
- An exported share via ksmbd supporting durable handles.
1) Alice creates a file on the share and opens it with a durable handle, then disconnects (releases the session while keeping the durable handle alive, creating an orphaned handle). The server stores Alice's identity (UID, GID, and account name) with the file as the durable owner and logs the durable handle creation with the owner.
2) Bob attempts to reconnect to the same durable handle using the durable handle's persistent ID (DHnC) but while authenticated as Bob.
3) Observe the server response:
- With the fix in place, the server compares Bob's identity against the stored durable_owner and rejects the reconnect due to a mismatch (e.g., EBADF/permission denied).
- Without the fix, the server would allow the reconnect, enabling Bob to hijack Alice's open file handle.
Notes:
- The exact method to obtain and use the DHnC value depends on the client tooling; in practice you may need a client that exposes the durable handle persistent_id or use a protocol trace to capture it.
- A minimal reproducible PoC in user space would require a client that supports SMB2 durable handles and a server that exposes the DHnC in its responses.
Conceptual Python-style pseudo-code (not guaranteed to run against all clients):
# Step 1: Alice creates a durable handle for a file
# durable_handle = smbclient.create_durable_handle(r"\\SERVER\SHARE\path\to\file", user="alice")
# dh_id = durable_handle.persistent_id
# Step 2: Alice disconnects to orphan the handle while keeping the durable handle alive
# Step 3: Bob reconnects using the same dh_id
# result = smbclient.reconnect_durable_handle(r"\\SERVER\SHARE\path\to\file", dh_id=dh_id, user="bob")
# Expected: result indicates failure due to owner mismatch (authentication/authorization failure)
Commit Details
Author: Namjae Jeon
Date: 2026-04-12 13:16 UTC
Message:
ksmbd: validate owner of durable handle on reconnect
Currently, ksmbd does not verify if the user attempting to reconnect
to a durable handle is the same user who originally opened the file.
This allows any authenticated user to hijack an orphaned durable handle
by predicting or brute-forcing the persistent ID.
According to MS-SMB2, the server MUST verify that the SecurityContext
of the reconnect request matches the SecurityContext associated with
the existing open.
Add a durable_owner structure to ksmbd_file to store the original opener's
UID, GID, and account name. and catpure the owner information when a file
handle becomes orphaned. and implementing ksmbd_vfs_compare_durable_owner()
to validate the identity of the requester during SMB2_CREATE (DHnC).
Fixes: c8efcc786146 ("ksmbd: add support for durable handles v1/v2")
Reported-by: Davide Ornaghi <d.ornaghi97@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Navaneeth K <knavaneeth786@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Triage Assessment
Vulnerability Type: Authentication/authorization bypass
Confidence: HIGH
Reasoning:
The commit adds verification of the reconnecting user against the original durable handle owner, storing the opener's identity and comparing it on SMB2 reconnects. This prevents a different authenticated user from hijacking an orphaned durable handle (auth/authorization bypass).
Verification Assessment
Vulnerability Type: Authentication/authorization bypass via durable handle reconnect (MS-SMB2 SecurityContext mismatch)
Confidence: HIGH
Affected Versions: 7.0-rc6 and earlier (before this commit 49110a8ce654bbe56bef7c5e44cce31f4b102b8a)
Code Diff
diff --git a/fs/smb/server/mgmt/user_session.c b/fs/smb/server/mgmt/user_session.c
index 39be2d2be86c3a..a86589408835bc 100644
--- a/fs/smb/server/mgmt/user_session.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/mgmt/user_session.c
@@ -382,12 +382,10 @@ void ksmbd_session_destroy(struct ksmbd_session *sess)
return;
delete_proc_session(sess);
-
+ ksmbd_tree_conn_session_logoff(sess);
+ ksmbd_destroy_file_table(sess);
if (sess->user)
ksmbd_free_user(sess->user);
-
- ksmbd_tree_conn_session_logoff(sess);
- ksmbd_destroy_file_table(&sess->file_table);
ksmbd_launch_ksmbd_durable_scavenger();
ksmbd_session_rpc_clear_list(sess);
free_channel_list(sess);
@@ -618,7 +616,7 @@ void destroy_previous_session(struct ksmbd_conn *conn,
goto out;
}
- ksmbd_destroy_file_table(&prev_sess->file_table);
+ ksmbd_destroy_file_table(prev_sess);
prev_sess->state = SMB2_SESSION_EXPIRED;
ksmbd_all_conn_set_status(id, KSMBD_SESS_NEED_SETUP);
ksmbd_launch_ksmbd_durable_scavenger();
diff --git a/fs/smb/server/oplock.c b/fs/smb/server/oplock.c
index 9b2bb8764a805b..cd3f28b0e7cb24 100644
--- a/fs/smb/server/oplock.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/oplock.c
@@ -1841,6 +1841,7 @@ int smb2_check_durable_oplock(struct ksmbd_conn *conn,
struct ksmbd_share_config *share,
struct ksmbd_file *fp,
struct lease_ctx_info *lctx,
+ struct ksmbd_user *user,
char *name)
{
struct oplock_info *opinfo = opinfo_get(fp);
@@ -1849,6 +1850,12 @@ int smb2_check_durable_oplock(struct ksmbd_conn *conn,
if (!opinfo)
return 0;
+ if (ksmbd_vfs_compare_durable_owner(fp, user) == false) {
+ ksmbd_debug(SMB, "Durable handle reconnect failed: owner mismatch\n");
+ ret = -EBADF;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
if (opinfo->is_lease == false) {
if (lctx) {
pr_err("create context include lease\n");
diff --git a/fs/smb/server/oplock.h b/fs/smb/server/oplock.h
index 921e3199e4df43..d91a8266e065ef 100644
--- a/fs/smb/server/oplock.h
+++ b/fs/smb/server/oplock.h
@@ -126,5 +126,6 @@ int smb2_check_durable_oplock(struct ksmbd_conn *conn,
struct ksmbd_share_config *share,
struct ksmbd_file *fp,
struct lease_ctx_info *lctx,
+ struct ksmbd_user *user,
char *name);
#endif /* __KSMBD_OPLOCK_H */
diff --git a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c
index 764a78dec46aed..d0b05878757eb8 100644
--- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c
@@ -3013,7 +3013,8 @@ int smb2_open(struct ksmbd_work *work)
}
if (dh_info.reconnected == true) {
- rc = smb2_check_durable_oplock(conn, share, dh_info.fp, lc, name);
+ rc = smb2_check_durable_oplock(conn, share, dh_info.fp,
+ lc, sess->user, name);
if (rc) {
ksmbd_put_durable_fd(dh_info.fp);
goto err_out2;
diff --git a/fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c b/fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c
index 87f63525062b11..3551f01a3fa035 100644
--- a/fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include "misc.h"
#include "mgmt/tree_connect.h"
#include "mgmt/user_session.h"
+#include "mgmt/user_config.h"
#include "smb_common.h"
#include "server.h"
#include "smb2pdu.h"
@@ -476,6 +477,8 @@ static void __ksmbd_close_fd(struct ksmbd_file_table *ft, struct ksmbd_file *fp)
if (ksmbd_stream_fd(fp))
kfree(fp->stream.name);
+ kfree(fp->owner.name);
+
kmem_cache_free(filp_cache, fp);
}
@@ -787,11 +790,13 @@ void ksmbd_update_fstate(struct ksmbd_file_table *ft, struct ksmbd_file *fp,
}
static int
-__close_file_table_ids(struct ksmbd_file_table *ft,
+__close_file_table_ids(struct ksmbd_session *sess,
struct ksmbd_tree_connect *tcon,
bool (*skip)(struct ksmbd_tree_connect *tcon,
- struct ksmbd_file *fp))
+ struct ksmbd_file *fp,
+ struct ksmbd_user *user))
{
+ struct ksmbd_file_table *ft = &sess->file_table;
struct ksmbd_file *fp;
unsigned int id = 0;
int num = 0;
@@ -804,7 +809,7 @@ __close_file_table_ids(struct ksmbd_file_table *ft,
break;
}
- if (skip(tcon, fp) ||
+ if (skip(tcon, fp, sess->user) ||
!atomic_dec_and_test(&fp->refcount)) {
id++;
write_unlock(&ft->lock);
@@ -856,7 +861,8 @@ static inline bool is_reconnectable(struct ksmbd_file *fp)
}
static bool tree_conn_fd_check(struct ksmbd_tree_connect *tcon,
- struct ksmbd_file *fp)
+ struct ksmbd_file *fp,
+ struct ksmbd_user *user)
{
return fp->tcon != tcon;
}
@@ -991,8 +997,62 @@ void ksmbd_stop_durable_scavenger(void)
kthread_stop(server_conf.dh_task);
}
+/*
+ * ksmbd_vfs_copy_durable_owner - Copy owner info for durable reconnect
+ * @fp: ksmbd file pointer to store owner info
+ * @user: user pointer to copy from
+ *
+ * This function binds the current user's identity to the file handle
+ * to satisfy MS-SMB2 Step 8 (SecurityContext matching) during reconnect.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, or negative error code on failure
+ */
+static int ksmbd_vfs_copy_durable_owner(struct ksmbd_file *fp,
+ struct ksmbd_user *user)
+{
+ if (!user)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Duplicate the user name to ensure identity persistence */
+ fp->owner.name = kstrdup(user->name, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!fp->owner.name)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ fp->owner.uid = user->uid;
+ fp->owner.gid = user->gid;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ksmbd_vfs_compare_durable_owner - Verify if the requester is original owner
+ * @fp: existing ksmbd file pointer
+ * @user: user pointer of the reconnect requester
+ *
+ * Compares the UID, GID, and name of the current requester against the
+ * original owner stored in the file handle.
+ *
+ * Return: true if the user matches, false otherwise
+ */
+bool ksmbd_vfs_compare_durable_owner(struct ksmbd_file *fp,
+ struct ksmbd_user *user)
+{
+ if (!user || !fp->owner.name)
+ return false;
+
+ /* Check if the UID and GID match first (fast path) */
+ if (fp->owner.uid != user->uid || fp->owner.gid != user->gid)
+ return false;
+
+ /* Validate the account name to ensure the same SecurityContext */
+ if (strcmp(fp->owner.name, user->name))
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
static bool session_fd_check(struct ksmbd_tree_connect *tcon,
- struct ksmbd_file *fp)
+ struct ksmbd_file *fp, struct ksmbd_user *user)
{
struct ksmbd_inode *ci;
struct oplock_info *op;
@@ -1002,6 +1062,9 @@ static bool session_fd_check(struct ksmbd_tree_connect *tcon,
if (!is_reconnectable(fp))
return false;
+ if (ksmbd_vfs_copy_durable_owner(fp, user))
+ return false;
+
conn = fp->conn;
ci = fp->f_ci;
down_write(&ci->m_lock);
@@ -1033,7 +1096,7 @@ static bool session_fd_check(struct ksmbd_tree_connect *tcon,
void ksmbd_close_tree_conn_fds(struct ksmbd_work *work)
{
- int num = __close_file_table_ids(&work->sess->file_table,
+ int num = __close_file_table_ids(work->sess,
work->tcon,
tree_conn_fd_check);
@@ -1042,7 +1105,7 @@ void ksmbd_close_tree_conn_fds(struct ksmbd_work *work)
void ksmbd_close_session_fds(struct ksmbd_work *work)
{
- int num = __close_file_table_ids(&work->sess->file_table,
+ int num = __close_file_table_ids(work->sess,
work->tcon,
session_fd_check);
@@ -1140,6 +1203,10 @@ int ksmbd_reopen_durable_fd(struct ksmbd_work *work, struct ksmbd_file *fp)
}
up_write(&ci->m_lock);
+ fp->owner.uid = fp->owner.gid = 0;
+ kfree(fp->owner.name);
+ fp->owner.name = NULL;
+
return 0;
}
@@ -1154,12 +1221,14 @@ int ksmbd_init_file_table(struct ksmbd_file_table *ft)
return 0;
}
-void ksmbd_destroy_file_table(struct ksmbd_file_table *ft)
+void ksmbd_destroy_file_table(struct ksmbd_session *sess)
{
+ struct ksmbd_file_table *ft = &sess->file_table;
+
if (!ft->idr)
return;
- __close_file_table_ids(ft, NULL, session_fd_check);
+ __close_file_table_ids(sess, NULL, session_fd_check);
idr_destroy(ft->idr);
kfree(ft->idr);
ft->idr = NULL;
diff --git a/fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.h b/fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.h
index 78b506c5ef03b7..866f32c10d4dda 100644
--- a/fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.h
+++ b/fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.h
@@ -68,6 +68,13 @@ enum {
FP_CLOSED
};
+/* Owner information for durable handle reconnect */
+struct durable_owner {
+ unsigned int uid;
+ unsigned int gid;
+ char *name;
+};
+
struct ksmbd_file {
struct file *filp;
u64 persistent_id;
@@ -114,6 +121,7 @@ struct ksmbd_file {
bool is_resilient;
bool is_posix_ctxt;
+ struct durable_owner owner;
};
static inline void set_ctx_actor(struct dir_context *ctx,
@@ -140,7 +148,7 @@ static inline bool ksmbd_stream_fd(struct ksmbd_file *fp)
}
int ksmbd_init_file_table(struct ksmbd_file_table *ft);
-void ksmbd_destroy_file_table(struct ksmbd_file_table *ft);
+void ksmbd_destroy_file_table(struct ksmbd_session *sess);
int ksmbd_close_fd(struct ksmbd_work *work, u64 id);
struct ksmbd_file *ksmbd_lookup_fd_fast(struct ksmbd_work *work, u64 id);
struct ksmbd_file *ksmbd_lookup_foreign_fd(struct ksmbd_work *work, u64 id);
@@ -166,6 +174,8 @@ void ksmbd_free_global_file_table(void);
void ksmbd_set_fd_limit(unsigned long limit);
void ksmbd_update_fstate(struct ksmbd_file_table *ft, struct ksmbd_file *fp,
unsigned int state);
+bool ksmbd_vfs_compare_durable_owner(struct ksmbd_file *fp,
+ struct ksmbd_user *user);
/*
* INODE hash